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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This appeal arises out of the District Court's decision granting Respondents Tim

Wengler's ("Wengler"), Melodee Anllfield's ("Annfield") and Shannon Cluney's ("Cluney")
Motions for Summary Judgment.

The District Court deternlined Appellant Jason Waidelich

("Waidelich"), a prisoner confined at Idaho Correctional Center ("ICC"), failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact concerning his claims that he did not receive proper notice that
sUbmitting an unduly dilute urine sample would subject him to disciplinary action, and that he
was treated differently than another, allegedly similarly situated inmate.
B.

Factual Background
In 2010 Waidelich was incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional Center ("ICC"), under the

immediate care and control of ICC Warden Tim Wengler. l R. Vol. I, p. 14. On August 11,
2010, Waidelich signed an ackl1 ow ledgement foml and confirmed he received a copy of the ICC
Inmate Handbook and agreed to read it and abide by ICC's rules and regulations. R. Vol. 1, p. 8,
~

8. Section 26 of the Inmate Handbook advised that inmates participating in the Therapeutic

Commtll1ity ("TC") Program (of which Waidelich was a member) would be subject to random
drug testing. R. VoL I, pp. 58-59,

~

6; R. Vol. I, p. 83. Section 39 of the Inmate Handbook

advised Waidelich that refusing to provide or adulterating a urine sample, or refusing to
cooperate with any drug/alcohol testing procedure was a Class A disciplinary infraction. R. Vol.
[ For purposes of this appeal only, and in light of the standard of review on appeal, Respondent Cluney treats as true
those uncontroverted facts set forth in Waidelich's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Should this Court reverse
the District Court's decision and remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings, Respondent
Cluney reserves his right to contest the facts alleged in Waidelich's Petition.

I, pp. 58-59,

~

7; R. Vol. I, p. 96.

At a parole hearing in July 2010, the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole ("the
Parole Commission") advised Waidelich he would be granted a parole date upon his completion
of the IC Program.

R. Vol. 1, p. 15,

December 17, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 15,

~

~

1.

Waidelich graduated from the TC Program on

3. Waidelich was notified that he would be paroled on

January 14,2011. Id.
On December 12, 2010, five days before graduating from the IC Program, Waidelich
was selected for dmg testing. R. Vol. I, p. 15,

~

2. Waidelich was in the middle of an exercise

workout when a correctional officer approached him and took him to the bathroom, where
Waidelich provided a urine sample. Id. On December 29,2010, Waidelich was served with a
Class A Disciplinary Offense Report for refusing to provide a valid urine sample because the
sample he provided on December 12 was unduly dilute. R. Vol. I, p. 15,

~

4; R. Vol. I, p. 24.

On December 30, 2010 Waidelich was taken to ICC's disciplinary unit, where Waidelich
provided a second urine sample. R. Vol. I, p. 15,

~'[

5-6.

Waidelich's disciplinary hearing OCCUlTed on January 5, 2011.

R. Vol. I, p. 15,

,r 7.

Waidelich pled not guilty and alleged that he needed to consume large amounts of water during
and after his workouts. Id.

Waidelich also alleged he was not provided notice that he could

receive disciplinary action under such circumstances.

Id.

During the hearing, ICC hearing

officer An11field allegedly stated to Waidelich that if the second urine analysis Waidelich
provided at the disciplinary unit was clean, she would dismiss the disciplinary offense. R. Vol. I,

2

p. 16,'! 7. At the conclusion of the hearing Waidelich was found to have engaged in the accused
conduct and penalties were imposed. lei.
Waidelich appealed the findings and penalties on January 11, 2011.
denied by Wengler. R. Vol. I, p. 16,

~

The appeal was

9. Waidelich appealed Wengler's denial to Cluney, the

Idaho Department of Correction's ("IDOC") then-Deputy Warden of Virtual Prisons.

lei.

Cluney advised Waidelich in writing that his appeal was denied pursuant to IDOC policy, which
provides that "a creatinine level of less than 20 mg/dl is very unlikely in a nonnal hydrated
individual with nonnal kidney function and would indicate some degree of dilution.,,2 R. Vol. I,
pp.24-25. Waidelich's December 12 urinalysis had a creatinine level of 10.5 mg/dl. R. Vol. I,
p. 23. Cluney advised Waidelich that a test result that comes back as diluted or tampered with is
considered the same as a positive result. R. Vol. I, pp. 24-25.
On January 20,2011, Waidelich allegedly received notice that his second urine sample
had tested clean. R. Vol. I, p. 16,

~

10. Annfield declined to change her finding of guilty or the

penalties imposed. lei. Waidelich was later notified by the Parole Commission that his release
date had been cancelled due to the disciplinary finding and that he would spend another two
years in prison before seeing the Parole Commission again. R. Vol. I, p. 16, ~ 11.
C.

Procedural Background
On October 14, 2011, Waidelich filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging

several claims concerning the disciplinary findings and the cancellation of his parole date. R.

~

- This particular policy is not available to inmates. R. Vol. I, p. 9.

3

Vol. I, p. 14. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4209, the District Court conducted an initial review of
Waidelich's Petition, dismissed Waidelich's claim that the penalties imposed for the disciplinary
offense violated his due process rights, and concluded Waidelich could proceed on two claims:
(l) that his due process rights under the United States and Idaho Constitutions were violated

because he did not receive prior notice that submitting an unduly dilute urine sample would
violate the disciplinary rule at issue; and (2) that his equal protection rights under the United
States and Idaho Constitutions were violated because he was treated differently than another
unnamed inmate who had a similar disciplinary offense but was still released on parole. R. Vol.

I, p. 39.
Wengler, Annfield and Cluney filed Motions for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. I, pp. 4243, 102-103. They argued the Writ should be dismissed for multiple reasons, including that
Waidelich had received proper notice of the disciplinary rule he was charged with violating and
that Waidelich failed to allege that he was a member of a protected class or identify with
specificity a similarly situated individual. R. Vol. I, pp. 49-55, 108-110.
Waidelich filed a memorandum in opposition to the motions and challenged the District
Court's Order dismissing his due process claim conceming the penalties imposed for the
disciplinary offense, and contended Idaho's habeas corpus statutes unlawfully suspended the writ
of habeas corpus. R. Vol. I, pp. 124-25. \Vaidelich admitted he received a copy of the Inmate
Handbook and admitted the Handbook advised that refusing to cooperate or providing an
adulterated urine sample constituted a disciplinary violation.

R. Vol. I, p. 127.

Waidelich

asselied, however, that his due process rights were violated because he was never told that

4

drinking too much water was considered a violation of the aforementioned rule. Ie!. Waidelich
also identified Chad Christian as the other allegedly similarly situated inmate. Ie!. Waidelich
contended Christian was found to have committed the disciplinary offense of refusing to provide
a valid urine sample because the sample he provided was unduly dilute but was still released on
parole. R. Vol. I, p. 126.
Wengler, An11field and Cluney thereafter filed reply briefs in support of their motions.
R. Vol. I, pp. 181-194. Wengler and Annfield submitted Annfield's affidavit, which established
that inmate Chad Christian was served with a disciplinary offense report on May 9, 2011 for
submitting a dilute urine sample.

R. Vol. I, p. 134,

~

7.

ICC follows the IDOC standard

operating procedure ("SOP") for inmate disciplinary proceedings. R. Vol. I, p. 134,

~

7. The

IDOC disciplinary SOP requires a hearing be scheduled on a disciplinary offense no later than
seven (7) calendar days after the inmate is served with the disciplinary offense report, but must
also allow the inmate at least 24 hours to prepare for the hearing. R. Vol. I, p. 135, ~ 8; R. Vol. I,
p. 156. Before the disciplinary hearing could be held, Christian was released on parole less than
24 hours after receiving the disciplinary offense report. R. Vol. I, p. 135,

~

9. In contrast to

Waidelich's case, where there was adequate time to hold a hearing on the report, there was not
sufficient time to hold a hearing prior to Christian's release, and therefore it was never confim1ed
that Christian engaged in the alleged conduct. R. Vol. I, p. 135,

'1'[ 9-10; R. Vol. I, p. 197"r 5.

The district court considered the parties' arguments and on May 8, 2012 issued a
Memorandum Decision and Order on the motions. R. Vol. I, pp. 202-207. The court rejected
Waidelich's challenge to the constitutionality of Idaho's habeas corpus statutes, noting that the

5

legislature may pass statutes regulating the use of the writ of habeas corpus. R. Vol. I, p. 202 fn.
2.
Addressing Waidelich's due process claim, the court concluded the undisputed evidence
indicated Waidelich received a copy of the Imnate Handbook, which advised him that it was a
disciplinary offense to refuse to provide or adulterate a urine sample or refuse to cooperate with
any drug/alcohol testing procedure in a medium or close custody facility. R. Vol. I, pp. 204-05.
The court held there was no genuine issue of material fact that Waidelich received prior notice of
the disciplinary offense he was confimled to have violated. Id.
With regard to the equal protection claim, the court held that the evidence submitted in
support of the motions indicated that although Christian was served with a disciplinary offense
report for an unduly dilute urine sample, he was released on parole before the required 24 hour
preparation period expired. R. Vol. I, pp. 205-06. The court therefore concluded there was no
opportunity to schedule and hold a disciplinary hearing prior to Christian's release. Id.

The

court found that Waidelich's unsupported assertions contained in his Writ were insufficient to
contest the evidence submitted by Wengler, Amlfield and Cluney. Id. Waidelich therefore failed
to establish a genuine issue of material fact existed on the equal protection claim. Id.
The district court dismissed Waidelich's claims and entered a judgment dismissing
Waidelich's Writ with prejudice that same day. R. Vol. I, p. 208. On June 4,2012, Waidelich
filed a Notice of Appeal concerning the May 8, 2012 Order and Judgment. R. Vol. I, pp. 212214.

6

n.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A.

Whether I.e. §§ 19-4205 and 19-4209 unconstitutionally suspend the Writ of
Habeas Corpus.

B.

Whether the District Court erred in holding Waidelich received adequate
notice that an unduly dilute urinalysis test result cou1d result in disciplinary
action.

C.

Whether the District Court erred in concluding Waidelich failed to establish
he was treated differently than a similarly situated individual as required to
establish an Equal Protection claim.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR APPEAL

In an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing a habeas

COlpUS

petition, the appellate

court is bound by the same standard of review as the trial court. See Freeman v. Idaho Dep 'f of

Corr.. 138 Idaho 872, 875, 71 P.3d 471, 474 (Ct. App. 2003).

Summary judgment under

I.R.c.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516, 519, 975 P.2d
1181, 1184 (Ct. App. 1999). When assessing summary judgment on a habeas corpus petition,
the appellate court treats all uncontroverted allegations in the petition as true, and liberally
construes all controverted facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
pm1y. See Id.; See also Freeman, 138 Idaho at 875, 71 P.3d at 474.
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V.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court properly rejected \Vaidelich's arguments concerning the
constitutionalitv off.C. §§ 19-4205 and 19-4209.
1.

Waidelich waived this issue on appeal by failing to cite authority in support
of his position.

Waidelich's first argument on appeal
unconstitutional.

See Appellant's Brief, p. 5.

1S

that LC. §§ 19-4205 and 19-4209 are

Waidelich concedes case law establishes the

legislature has the ability to enact legislation regulating the procedural use of the wIit, but
contends Le. §§ 19-4205 and 19-4209 go too far and instead constitute "sweeping changes" that
"impose severe limitations on the issues that may be raised under habeas corpus as well as the
parties that may be named and the discretion of the courts to resolve those matters."

See

Appellant's Brief at 6. Plaintiff cites no legal authority in support of this contention and aside
from his bare assertion of unconstitutionality provides no details as to how the challenged
statutes violate the constitutional writ of habeas corpus. See Id.
A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking.
Kootenai Afedical Center v. Idaho Dep't of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 880,216 F.3d
630, 638 (2009). The Supreme Court has declined to address a party's arguments on appeal
when that party's argument is unpersuasive and lacks citation to authority. See Id. Waidelich
has failed to present a persuasive argument supported by any legal authority conceming the
constitutionality of the habeas corpus statutes. The cases Waidelich does cite in the section of
his brief conceming the statutes instead concern other legal issues separate from the
constitutionality of Idaho's habeas corpus statutes. By failing to provide any legal support for

8

his position Waidelich has waived this issue and the Court should decline to address it on appeal.
2.

The statutes at issue permissibly regulate the use of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus.

Even if this Court decides to address Waidelich's argument conceming the two statutes,
the law establishes the statutes are a permissible exercise of legislative authority.

The

Constitution of the United States provides that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."
U.S. Const. Art. I § 9 cl. 2. The Idaho Constitution contains nearly identical language. See
Idaho Constitution Article 1, § 5. Given the language is nearly identical and that Waidelich does
not contend the two provisions should be interpreted differently, Idaho case law provides useful
guidance for analyzing Waidelich's argument.
!

The Idaho Supreme Court held that while the legislature (absent certain contingencies) is
without power to abridge the remedy of habeas corpus, it may add to the efficacy of the writ by
enacting a statutory process conceming the exercise of the writ. See Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho
228, 231, 392 P.2d 279, 280 (1964). Statutes enacted for this purpose should be construed so as
to promote the effectiveness ofthe proceeding. fd.
Idaho Code Section 19-4205 does not suspend the right of habeas corpus in violation of
the Idaho Constitution, but instead provides a procedure for application and consideration of the
writ. The Jegislaturehas the authority to enact sud1 procedures, and the procedures setfOlih in

I.e. §§

19-4205 and 19-4209 do not suspend the right of habeas corpus.

9

As such, Idaho's

statutory scheme, including Idaho Code §§ 19-4205 and 19-4209, do not violate either the U.S.
or the Idaho Constitutions. 3 The district court's decision should therefore be affinned.
B.

ICC proyided Waidelich with adequate notice that providing an adulterated
urinalysis specimen could subject him to disciplinarY action and the District Court
therefore properlv dismissed his Due Process claim.

Waidelich next alleges he was not provided prior notice of the disciplinary offense
because he was never advised that ingesting too much liquid over a period of time could result in
a disciplinary infraction which could cost him his parole date. See Appellant's Brief, p. 8. The
Ninth Circuit held prisoners are entitled to adequate notice that sanctioned conduct was
prohibited. See Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9 th Cir. 1996), citing RiGS v. Lane, 812 F.2d
1032

(7th

Cif. 1987) and Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362 (5 th Cir. 1984). A review of these

cases compels the conclusion that Waidelich received adequate notice of the sanctioned conduct
in advance of being accused ofthe disciplinary offense.
In Newell, the imnate was disciplined for having another inmate's legal work in his cell,
which prison authorities asserted violated a prison regulation prohibiting possession of "anything
not authorized for retention or receipt by the prisoner." See Newell, 79 F.3d at 118. The inmate
was a law librarian, which pemlitted him to assist other inmates with their legal work, and was
pel111itted to have a computer in his cell. Id. In light of these pennissions granted by prison

3 Just last year, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a somewhat similar argument that Idaho's post-conviction scheme
unconstitutionally restricted the right of habeas corpus for defendants in capital cases. See Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho
35,47,232 P.3d 813, 825 (2011) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1472, 179 L. Ed. 2d 313 (U.S. 2011). The Supreme Court
held that Idaho's post-conviction statues did not deny the writ of habeas COlpUS, but instead provided an alternate
procedure for capital cases. See Id.

10

authorities, the Ninth Circuit concluded the regulation did not provide him with notice that
possessing typewritten legal materials for another inmate was prohibited. Id.
In Rios, the im11ate gave another inmate an index card listing several Spanish language
radio stations that could be received within prison walls and citing several slogans copied from a
Socialist newspaper that prison officials had authorized the inmate to possess. See Rios, 812
F.2d at 1035.

Prison officials charged the inmate with violating a prison rule prohibiting

involvement in gang activity. Id. at 1034. The regulation at issue defined gang activity as
"engaging or pressuring others to engage in gang activities or meetings, displaying, wearing or
using gang insignia, or giving gang signals." Id. Prison officials alleged the inmate's use of the
slogans was an attempt to recruit another inmate to participate in organized gang activity. !d.
The Seventh Circuit concluded the regulation at issue failed to give the imnate adequate notice
that copying slogans from a prison-approved newspaper and providing them to another illlJate
could subject him to disciplinary action. Id. at 1038-39.
Prison officials in Adams found two inmates violated a prison regulation prohibiting
"condu'ct which disrupts the orderly running of the Institution" because they signed an inmatecreated and circulated petition alleging prison officials discriminated against African-American
inmates. Adams, 729 F.2d at 364-65. The Fifth Circuit noted that the evidence indicated one of
the inmates had signed two other inmate-created and circulated petitions without disciplinary
action. Id. at 369. The cOUli concluded nothing in the regulation gave the inmates notice that
signing or circulating a petition was prohibited conduct. Id. "Unlike otherwise illegal conduct
or acts of clear disobedience or insubordination, such patiicipation in a petition 'does not calTY

11

with it its own warning of wrongdoing." Jd., citing Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 478 (5 th
CiL 1983).
The above cases involved circumstances where prison officials disciplined offenders for
conduct wholly unrelated to the regulation at issue. In Newell, the offender was disciplined for
having typewritten legal materials for other imnates in his cell. The regulation did not prohibit
possession of typewritten legal materials or prohibit the possession of other offenders' legal
materials. Rather, it simply prohibited possessing anything not authorized by prison authorities.
Given that the prison allowed him to assist other imnates with their legal work pemlitted him to
retain a computer in his cell, the inmate had no notice that possessing such materials in his cell
was not authorized. In Rios, the inmate shared slogans from a prison-approved newspaper with
another inmate. The inmate had no notice that sharing slogans from prison-approved material
would be considered attempting to recruit someone for gang activity. In Adams, the offenders
signed a petition to prison authorities. Two other such petitions had been signed and circulated
and prison officials took no disciplinary action.

There was no prior notice to offenders that

signing the particular petition at issue would be considered disruptive conduct.
The regulation at issue in this appeal, however, is distinguishable from the above cases.
The regulation specifically speaks to the condition of mine samples provided by inmates and
gave Waidelich fair notice that providing an adulterated urine sample could subject him to a
discip linary offense. Section 39 of the Inmate Handbook advised Waidelich that adulterating a
urine sample or refusing to cooperate with any drug/alcohol testing procedure was a Class A
disciplinary infraction.

R. Vol. 1, pp. 58-59,

12

~

7; R. Vol. I, p. 96.

Prior to receiving the

disciplinary offense report, Waidelich acknowledged receiving the regulation at issue and agreed
to abide by it. R. Vol. I, p. 8,

~

8.

The above-cited case law establishes that due process does not require specific notice, but
only "fair" notice of prohibited conduct.

See Newell, 79 F.3d at 117-118 ("It is clearly

established, both by common sense and by precedent, that due process requires fair notice of
what conduct is prohibited before a sanction can be imposed.")( emphasis added); See Adams,
729 at 369 ("Instead, we must consider whether the catch-all rule is impennissibly vague as
applied to the conduct of these plaintiffs-that is, whether they had fair warning that their
conduct was proscribed. ") (emphasis added). The concept of fair notice does not require that
prison officials spell out every circumstance that could constitute an adulterated sample or
refusing to cooperate.
The regulation put Waidelich on notice that his conduct was prohibited. The conduct he
was disciplined for is clearly related to the regulation. This is not a situation where the conduct
had absolutely no connection to the violation alleged.

Instead, it is entirely foreseeable to a

person of ordinary intelligence that SUbmitting a watered down urine sample could constitute
providing an adulterated urine sample or refusing to cooperate with the drug testing process.
Waidelich cannot establish a violation of his due process rights and the district court's decision
dismissing his due process claim should be affinned.

13

C.

The District Court properlv dismissed Waidelich's equal protection claim.
1. Waidelich cannot establish a liberty interest in parole and therefore cannot

establish a constitutional violation.

Waidelich next argues that his equal protection rights were violated because he was
treated differently than inmate Christian, who Waidelich contends received a disciplinary offense
report for the same alleged violation but was still released on parole. See Appellant's Brief, p. 8.
Waidelich, however, has no constitutional right to parole and therefore is unable to establish a
violation of his constitutional rights.
The United States Supreme Court held, "[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a
convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence."

Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Idaho courts have consistently
agreed and held there is no right to parole. Izatt v. State, 104 Idaho 597, 661 P.2d 763 (Cl. App.

1983); Hays v. Craven, 131 Idaho 761, 963 P.2d 1198 eCt. App. 1998). "[I]t has long been
settled-that the possibility of parole is not protected by due process and that inmates have no
constitutional right to due process in parole hearings." Drennon v. Craven, 141 Idaho 34, 36,
(

105 P.3d 694 eCL App. 2004). Rather, Idaho statutes merely provide the possibility of parole.

Hays, 131 Idaho at 764 (citing Izatt, 104 Idaho at 600). And that possibility rests solely in the
discretion of the Parole Commission.Vittone v. State, 114 Idaho 618, 619, 759 P.2d 909 eCt.
App. 1988); See also Idaho Code § 20-223( c).

14

Since Waidelich has no liberty interest at stake with respect to release on parole, due
process, and by extension equal protection, does not apply. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
115 S.Ct. 293 (1995) (under the U.S. Constitution, due process does not apply if no liberty
interest is implicated); Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 930 P.2d 603 (1996) (if no liberty
interest at stake due process under the Idaho Constitution does not apply.) As explained by the
Idaho Court of Appeals in Brandt v. State, 126 Idaho 101,878 P.2d 800 eCt. App. 1994), "[t]he
Commission's conduct in advising Brandt of a tentative release date created only a hope, not a
constitutionally protected expectancy, that he would be released at that time." Ie!. at 105. The
court further explained that "this disappointment is not a loss of liberty against which the due
process clause affords protection or for which we may provide a remedy."
reasoning would likewise apply in this instance.

]d.

This same

With no constitutionally protected libeliy

interest at stake, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection would not apply.

2. Waidelich cannot establish Christian was a similarly situated individual.
Even if this Court determines Waidelich has raised a valid equal protection claim,
Waidelich has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. In order to state a claim
for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fomieenth Amendment, Waidelich must show
that Respondents acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the petitioner based
upon membership in a protected class. See Barrell v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9 th
Cir. 1998). Waidelich has made no such allegation and therefore has failed to establish a valid
claim.
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Waidelich's claim also fails because he cannot establish he was similarly situated to
inmate Christian. While it is true inmate Chad Christian was served with a disciplinary offense
report on May 9, 2011 for sUbmitting a dilute urine sample, Christian was released on parole the
foliowing day, before a disciplinary hearing could be held. R. Vol. I, p. 134,
135,

,r

9.

,r 7; R. Vol. I, p.

A hearing could not be held prior to Christian's release because the IDOC SOP

required inmates receive at least 24 hours to prepare for the hearing. R. Vol. I, p. 135,

,r 8; R.

Vol. I, p. 156. In Waidelich's case a disciplinary hearing was held and a disciplinary hearing
officer confirmed Waidelich engaged in the prohibited conduct. R. Vol. I, p. 16,

~

7. In

Christian's case, however, there was not sufficient time to hold a hearing prior to Christian's
release, and Christian was never confinned to have engaged in the alleged conduct. R. Vol. I, p.
135, ~'l9-10; R. Vol. I, p. 197"r 5. This difference distinguishes the two individuals.
Further, as the district court noted in its Memorandum Decision and Order, there are a
myriad of considerations at issue when the Parole Commission decides whether to grant or deny
parole.

R. Vol. I, p. 205.

Waidelich camlot establish Christian was a similarly situated

individual without establishing they were similarly situated as to each of the considerations.
Waidelich has made no such showing and therefore calIDot establish he was similarly situated to
Christian. Waidelich cannot establish a violation of his equal protection rights and the district
court's decision dismissing his equal protection claim should be affim1ed.
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D.

Respondent Clune\' takes no position concerning Waidelich's appeal of the District
Court's denial of his motion for appointment of counsel.

Waidelich's last argument is that the District Court improperly denied his request for
appointment of counsel. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10. Respondent Cluney takes no position
on this issue.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affinn the District Court's decision granting
summary judgment and dismissing Waidelich's writ with prejudice.
DATED this 6 th day of December, 2012.

By:_---'~=--_--~-----
Colleen D. Zahn
Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent Cluney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6 th day of December, 2012, I caused to be served two
true copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:
Jason E. Waidelich, IDOC No. 69811
ICC L 117 B
P.O. Box 70010
Boise,ID 83707

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
X Prison Mail

Kirtlan G. Naylor
James E. Stoll
Naylor & Hales, P.c.
950 W Bam10ck Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail

Colleen D. Zahn
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